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The current situation is 
unsustainable, it’s unsustainable for 
the NHS and it’s also unsustainable 
for manufacturers. It is time to find 
the political will to address the real 
problem that NHS patients face in 
accessing new medicines and that 
manufactures face in getting market 
access and an early return on their 
investments. The real problem has 
been, and remains, the discrepancy 
between the price charged and how 
much the NHS can afford to pay for 
the benefits that new medicines 
offer.
An evidenced based and 
accountable assessment of the 
additional benefits offered by 
a new drug is required and the 
National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence (NICE) has done 
an excellent job over the years in 
assessing those benefits; not just 
within the licensing trials but also 
taking account of other evidence to 
try and assess the longer run effects 
on survival and quality of life. NICE 
also assesses the additional cost to 
the NHS. Not just the cost of the 
drug itself but all future NHS costs, 
including any potential cost savings.
How much can the NHS afford to 
pay for the benefits offered by a 
new drug?
Importantly, it depends on what 
health could have been gained 
elsewhere if the additional 
resources required had been 
available to offer effective 
treatments for other NHS patients. 
We now know something about 
what the scale of these health 
opportunity costs are likely to be 
across the NHS. Recent research 
has, for the first time, estimated 
the effects of changes in NHS 
expenditure on the health of all 
NHS patients. [1] The evidence 
suggests that every £13,000 of 
NHS resources adds one Quality 
Adjusted Life Year (QALY) to the 
lives of NHS patients. So, for 
example, a new drug that costs 
the NHS an additional £10m each 
year is likely to lead to the loss 
of 773 QALYs each year, with 
increased mortality and reduced 
survival in cancer, circulatory, 
respiratory or gastro-intestinal 
diseases and reduced quality of life 
in neurological diseases and mental 
health. [1,2]
What does this mean for the 
NHS? One thing it means is that 
increasing expenditure on the 
NHS appears to be very good 
value; £13,000 adds one QALY to 
the lives of NHS patients. We also 
have evidence that every QALY 
gained or lost through spending 
on the NHS is also associated with 
£13,000 of benefits in the wider 
economy.[2] In a sense, the NHS 
pays for itself. Recent research 
also suggests that NHS expenditure 
tends to reduce health inequalities. 
[3] You might think £13,000 per 
QALY is too low and the NHS should 
be able to afford to pay more for 
improvements in health. If you do, 
then you need to consider whether 
we should raise more taxes, extend 
public borrowing, or substantially 
reallocate public expenditure.
Implications for NICE and recent 
policy initiatives?
What does this mean for NICE? 
NICE says it uses a threshold range 
of £20,000 to £30,000 per QALY 
when considering whether a new 
drug is cost-effective and should 
be approved for widespread use. 
This range is based on the values 
implied by the decisions NICE 
made between 1999 and 2003, [4] 
but over recent years it generally 
does not reject below £30,000 
per QALY. In fact, the most recent 
evidence indicates that, on average, 
it approves new technologies at 
just over £40,000 per QALY. [5] This 
suggests that, on average, when 
NICE approves a new drug it does 
more harm than good to
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population health, with a ratio of QALYs lost to QALYs 
gained of at least three to one. [2] This means that without 
addressing the question of price, accelerating access 
by NICE approving new drugs more quickly will simply 
accelerate the net harm and increase the scale of the net 
harm done to the rest of the NHS. 
The Accelerated Access Review, proposed changes to the 
Cancer Drugs Fund as well as previous consideration of Value 
Based Assessment, have all failed to address this fundamental 
problem. Instead they appear to ignore or deny it. That denial 
over recent years has come in many different forms. For 
example, the notion that the discrepancy between the price 
charged and how much the NHS can afford to pay can be 
resolved by taking account of potential cost savings that have 
been ignored by NICE is profoundly mistaken. The principle of 
taking account of future costs saving has always been part of 
the methods of NICE appraisal.
Some suggest that the measure of health adopted by 
NICE (the QALY) is the problem. But using other ways to 
measure health gained and health lost elsewhere is not 
going to overcome the fundamental difficulty either. We 
might wish to give greater weight to health effects where 
disease is severe. Again this won’t solve the problem 
because, irrespective of the definitions of severity and the 
different weights that might be used, they would need to 
be applied equally to health gained and the type of health 
lost elsewhere, some of which is also in areas of quite high 
severity. [2] Considering the impacts outside the NHS on 
the rest of the economy won’t resolve the issue either. 
Some new drugs offer benefits to the wider economy but 
some impose net costs. We also know that the health that 
we are likely to forego is associated with benefits in the 
wider economy. [2] So none of these considerations ‘square 
the circle’ of the current discrepancy between the prices 
charged for many new drugs and how much the NHS can 
afford to pay for the benefits they offer.
We are sometimes told that if costs can be reduced for 
manufacturers then prices will come down. The problem 
is that prices are not determined by the costs. The costs 
of developing new drugs are determined by the price that 
health care systems are willing to pay for new drugs. That’s 
how capital markets work. If investors believe that health 
care systems are willing to pay more, more capital will flow 
into the sector and costs of development will rise until 
there is a normal return on those investments. Costs don’t 
determine price. It’s exactly the other way round.
Some express concern that unless the NHS continues to pay 
what are often unaffordable prices, innovation will not be 
supported and investment in research and development 
into the UK will be discouraged. Domestic prices have very 
little to do with the location of research and development. 
Much more important is investment in the type of basic 
science, which will provide the foundation of future 
innovation, and in evaluative research, so that the research 
environment in the UK is the best place to develop and 
evaluate new products. Using resources in this way will do 
much more to make the UK a more attractive place to invest 
than using the same resources to pay unaffordable prices 
for existing products.
The Cancer Drugs Fund
The Cancer Drugs Fund has been a real lesson 
demonstrating, beyond all reasonable doubt, that there 
is no blank cheque big enough to square this circle. The 
budget for the CDF rose from £50m in 2010/11 to £280m 
in 2014/15 but overspent by £136m. The budget for 
2015/16 was increased to £340m but, despite a review 
of which drugs were funded, has significantly over-spent 
again.[6] The CDF has not been a sustainable solution 
to this problem and originally was never intended to 
be one. It was introduced as a temporary measure until 
pharmaceutical pricing was addressed through value 
based pricing [7]. But that fundamental issue remains to 
be resolved. As a consequence it has done considerable 
net harm to population health. Even an optimistic 
assessment of the QALY benefits of the drugs funded by 
the CDF suggests a ratio of harm to benefit of at least five 
to one.1 [6] Although some manufacturers with oncology 
drugs have clearly benefited from the scheme, it has not 
been of particular benefit to the sector as a whole. It has 
offered perverse incentives and introduced unfairness 
between manufacturers because many that have not 
benefited from it have, nonetheless, paid greater rebates 
through the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
(PPRS) as a consequence. It wasn’t intended as a long-term 
sustainable solution and it hasn’t been; for the NHS or the 
pharmaceutical sector as a whole.  Nor has it ultimately 
avoided the political difficulties of NHS patients facing 
restricted access to new cancer drugs.
What about the current plans to reform the CDF; where 
those drugs which are not cost-effective even by NICE’s 
standards will be funded within the scheme if there is a 
chance they might be shown to be cost-effective after data 
has been collected for two years. There are some good 
things. NICE will become responsible for the assessment 
of the benefits and costs of new cancer drugs. There’s 
also a contingency which means that if the CDF budget is 
exceeded then manufacturers won’t get the revenue that 
was initially expected and the budget will not overspend as 
it has in the past.
These two aspects of the reforms sound like good things but 
what are the incentives? The incentives for manufacturers 
are to provide as little evidence as possible at launch to 
make sure there is sufficient uncertainty at NICE appraisal 
and become eligible for CDF funding because there remains 
a chance that they might be cost-effective after two years of 
data collection. The second incentive is for manufacturers 
to price as high as possible. All manufacturers should expect 
the CDF budget to be exceeded and contingency funds to be 
withheld. To get the greatest share of the CDF budget, each 
manufacturer has an incentive to ensure their prices are 
as are as high as possible. Of course, there also remains a 
question of whether NICE will feel able to reject a drug after 
two years once it has become widely used. Recent history 
suggests it may not, in which case there is an incentive to 
1 In 2013/14 the fund spent £231m treating 19,282 patients. An optimistic 
assessment of the benefits can be based on assuming an average 3 month 
overall survival benefit per patient (most funded drugs offered less than 3 
months overall survival benefit) at a quality of life of 0.7. This suggests benefits 
of 3,374 QALYs but health opportunity costs of 17,821 QALYs lost elsewhere for 
other NHS patients, based on the recent estimate of £12,936 per QALY. [1,6] 
establish a high price at the outset.
Possibly the greatest threat though is the faith in what’s 
called ‘real world’ data. In the context of the CDF reforms, 
that appears to mean drug registries; observing what 
happens to patients using the new drug but without proper 
controls; observing similar patients not taking the new 
drug. Even if we have data from disease (rather than drug) 
registries we still need sufficient variation in treatment 
assignment, not different patients being treated differently, 
but the same type of patients treated differently. Without 
it comparisons will not be possible or will be biased 
because patients using and not using the new drug differ 
in important ways, some of which we can’t observe. It 
becomes impossible to properly assess what would have 
happened to survival and quality of life without access to 
the drug. The presumption that we can necessarily gain 
useful and unbiased evidence in this way without seriously 
addressing these profound difficulties, ignores some of 
the basic principles of clinical epidemiology, what we 
know about good research design and Nobel-prize winning 
work on how to analyse observational data to understand 
causal effects. It ignores all the reasons why randomised 
controlled trials are, quite rightly, the cornerstone of 
evidence based medicine. 
There is a real danger that these proposals will undermine 
the evidence base for clinical practice in the long run, 
which may be an even greater threat to health outcomes 
for cancer and other NHS patients than paying for cost-
ineffective drugs through the CDF while the type of 
‘research’ envisaged is undertaken. We will not know what 
works and what doesn’t work and for whom. Nor will we 
have the opportunity to find out later once these products 
are in widespread use because it will be impossible to 
conduct the type of randomised trials that would be 
required. [8]
A mechanism to take a more sensible approach is available. 
It’s one of the statutes on which NICE was founded, which 
says NICE has a responsibility to identify technologies that 
should only be used in the context of research and make 
‘only in research’ recommendations. NICE asked the MRC 
to fund research to establish how NICE might make better 
use of these powers. [9,10] That research shows how the 
need for additional evidence might be judged and indicates 
that when we are unsure as to whether a new drug is 
worthwhile, and especially when the balance of evidence 
suggests it is not, NICE should make an ‘only in research’ 
recommendation which restricts use to within research 
that can resolve uncertainties. Restricting approval to only 
in research means that the type of randomised trials that 
are needed can be conducted. It also means that when 
the research reports, NICE is in a position to consider 
whether the drug should be approved for widespread use 
or rejected.
Of course, in making ‘only in research’ recommendations 
we do need to consider better and more innovative 
research designs, for example random allocation to groups 
that have access to current NHS care and those that also 
have access to the new drug. We also need to consider 
who will fund and conduct this research. Instead of paying 
for the widespread use of cost-ineffective drugs while 
inadequate data is collected, the resources devoted to 
the Cancer Drugs Fund could instead be used to fund well 
designed independent research that would resolve some of 
these questions and have a much bigger impact on patient 
outcomes.
The Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme
There is one good thing in recent history; at least there 
are some good elements to it. The current Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme, which was negotiated in 2014, 
agreed caps on NHS spending on branded drugs. Rebates 
are paid at a national level by manufacturers based on their 
historic market share, when the caps are exceeded. It’s 
good in two respects. It has protected the NHS somewhat 
and substantial rebates are being paid. Importantly it 
demonstrates that national rebate mechanisms are possible 
and can be agreed.
What are the problems with the PPRS? We don’t know 
if the cap was set too high, or too low because the cap 
wasn’t based on an assessment of the value of the branded 
drugs the NHS currently pays for. It doesn’t offer the 
right incentives either. It is unfair to manufacturers who 
produce valuable drugs and are responsible in their pricing. 
For example manufacturers with very effective drugs at 
reasonable prices are potentially paying higher rebates than 
those manufacturers with drugs offering modest benefits at 
unaffordable prices. It fails to distinguish the most valuable 
innovations compared to those of more limited value 
and again offers an incentive to price as high as possible 
to retain the greatest share of capped expenditure. Also, 
the rebate is paid at a national level so it doesn’t reach 
the prescribers who still face (unrebated) prices and high 
prescribing costs that fall directly on their budgets. As a 
consequence there is no incentive for early uptake. 
The PPRS will be renegotiated in 2020. At that point 
manufacturers could point to the fact that the caps on 
expenditure have been exceeded and should be increased. 
Unless the question of what price the NHS can afford to pay 
is addressed and some mechanism to adjust how much the 
NHS pays is in place, the UK Department of Health will not 
be in a strong position to resist these arguments.
This is especially acute as failing to agree continued rebates 
will remove the protection the NHS has had from cost-
ineffective drugs that have become widely used. There is an 
urgent need to find a solution to this fundamental problem.
There is a solution
There is a solution and it has been available for some time.
[7,11] It was set out in the consultation on value based 
pricing in 2010 but only now are all the elements required 
in place.[12] All that is needed is to link NICE appraisal 
of the costs and benefits of new drugs with the type of 
national rebate agreements in the current PPRS. The 
difference is that the rebates should reflect the discrepancy 
between the prices manufacturers wish to charge for their 
products and how much the NHS can afford to pay for the 
benefits they provide.
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This would offer the right incentives for manufacturers. 
It would provide a clear and predictable signal of what 
the NHS can afford to pay for the benefits offered by 
developing a new drug, which is what they need to make 
good long term investment decisions. It would also provide 
fair rewards for innovation, because those manufacturers 
that produce more effective drugs at affordable prices will 
not need to pay a rebate but those that wish to maintain 
high prices for drugs of modest benefit will pay higher 
rebates. Manufacturers also need to be able to set prices 
for global markets without fear that offering lower prices 
in the UK will be referenced elsewhere. That’s why rebates 
at a national level are so important. The current PPRS 
shows that how much NHS ultimately pays for drugs can 
be adjusted through a national rebate agreement without 
asking manufacturers to change their prices for the UK.
Manufacturers also require some assurance that once 
they have developed an effective new drug and agreed a 
rebate, that there will be early uptake and they will get 
the volume of prescribing appropriate to its indication. 
For example, NHS England and the Department of Health 
could retain some of the expenditure on new drugs to fully 
reimburse those who prescribe products where a rebate 
agreement is in place. This would avoidthe current problem 
of commissioner and prescribers facing high prices falling 
directly on their budgets. As a consequence, where rebates 
are agreed and local prescribing costs are fully reimbursed, 
there would be an incentive for early uptake and no reason 
why patient access should differ across the NHS.
This would mean that NICE could focus on what it does 
best; assessing the costs and benefits of new drugs based 
on the evidence. Manufacturers can then decide if they 
wish to agree to any rebate that might be required. If they 
do, prescribers would be fully reimbursed. If they don’t 
wish to agree a rebate then their product would still be 
available for use but would not be reimbursed, so the full 
cost would fall on prescriber’s budgets. NICE would no 
longer be placed in the politically difficult and potentially 
compromising position of being asked to approve or reject 
new drugs. Instead it can focus on an accountable and 
transparent assessment of the evidence.
Linking the NICE appraisal to value based rebates requires 
an assessment of how much the NHS can afford to pay for 
the benefits offered and that requires some assessment 
of health opportunity costs. For the first time we have an 
empirical estimate of the scale of health opportunity costs 
in the NHS. [1] Of course, as with any piece of empirical 
research, there are uncertainties. For example, currently 
we can only directly estimate the effect of changes in NHS 
expenditure on mortality outcomes. The important thing 
is that this research demonstrates that it is an empirical 
question that can be addressed and periodically re-
estimated as more and better data become available. An 
ongoing evidence based and accountable assessment of 
health opportunity costs would give manufactures the 
clear and predictable signal they need in making good 
investment decisions; aligning their incentives with what 
the NHS needs and how much it can afford to pay.
